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I. INTRODUCTION
"Forum shopping" typically refers to the act of seeking the most
advantageous venue in which to try a case.' Forum shopping can take
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place "horizontally" when a party is shopping for the best venue from
among courts within the same court system, such as when a party is
shopping for the best state court in which to litigate his case. Forum
shopping can also take place "vertically" when a party is trying to
move from state court to federal court or vice versa. Regardless of
which type of forum shopping is taking place, attorneys filing lawsuits
or defending against lawsuits usually have the same objective when it
comes to evaluating or seeking a venue - they seek a venue in which
their clients can not only get a fair trial, but in which their clients
might gain some advantage or begin with the odds in their favor.2
Many practicing attorneys and judges were led to believe in law
school that forum shopping was a terrible thing, practiced by only the
most manipulative and devious attorneys. 3 This teaching may have
confused some who may have wondered why venue and jurisdictional
L. REv. 11, 14 ("'Forum shopping' is commonly defined as attempting to have
one's case heard in the forum where it has the greatest chance of success.");
Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: the Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. Mnmi L. REv. 267, 268 (1996) ("Forum-shopping 'occurs when a
party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.'" (quoting BLACes
LAw DIcTIoNARY 655 (6th ed. 1990))).
2. An attorney who is forum shopping might take into account any one or more of
the following factors: the reputation of the judges in a particular trial court and
the corresponding appellate court; an evaluation of the reputation and character-
istics of potential jurors who would make up the jury venire; potential success by
counsel for both parties in the jurisdiction, including perceived advantages attor-
neys might have in that jurisdiction because of political connections, friendships,
family name, past success, or current reputation; the political climate and bias in
a particular jurisdiction; the characteristics and reputation of one's own client in
light of the above; traditional factors of convenience, including convenience of
witnesses, parties, and attorneys; procedural rules existing in the venue; and the
law likely to be applied in a particular jurisdiction. See Laurie P. Cohen, South-
ern Exposure: Lawyer Gets Investors to Sue GE, Prudential in Poor Border Town,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at Al, for a candid discussion of the motives of an
attorney who filed a complex securities-fraud case in a poor Texas town. See also
Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1677, 1678-80 (1990).
For example, as the Court explained in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 250 (1981), "jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied.
As a result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums. Ordi-
narily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most
advantageous." See also Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a
Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International
Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769, 776-77 (1995) (noting that litigators frequently
believe that the forum in which a case is litigated will dictate the outcome of the
case).
3. See generally John B. Corr, Thoughts On The Vitality Of Erie, 41 ArMf. U. L. REv.
1087, 1111 (1992) (recognizing the "disreputable" connotation of the term "forum
shopping"); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,
63 TUL. L. REv. 553, 553 (1989) ("As a rule, counsel, judges, and academicians
employ the term 'forum shopping' to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion,
unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.
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provisions existed that allowed some discretion in selecting a forum,
yet "shopping" for a forum was taboo. Thus, "selecting" a forum was a
necessary practice for those filing a lawsuit; "shopping" for one, on the
other hand, was forbidden. Likewise, "evaluating" the plaintiffs cho-
sen forum was certainly necessary to adequately represent a defend-
ant, but "shopping" for a better forum was forbidden.
The confusion may have been compounded when these graduates
began to practice law and were asked by their respected colleagues to
evaluate jurisdiction and venue for the cases to which they were as-
signed. Were they being asked to compromise their legal ethics al-
ready and join the ranks of the manipulative and devious, or were
they just being asked to apply the procedural rules and analyze their
cases thoroughly? The most likely answer to the question raised
above is that these attorneys were being asked to zealously represent
their clients and thoroughly analyze their cases in light of the gov-
erning procedural rules. After all, most attorneys believe that where
an action will be litigated is a significant factor in evaluating the mer-
its of a case.4
So then, what is or should be forbidden or discouraged under the
term "forum shopping"? Perhaps it refers only to those egregious cir-
cumstances in which attorneys file suits in forums allowed by law, but
inconvenient because of their lack of connection to the issues involved
in the lawsuits. Often these "egregious" circumstances occur when the
client's only chance of proceeding with a lawsuit is in a remote forum,
which may occur when the client has waited too long to seek the
assistance of an attorney. The attorney may file in the remote forum,
hoping to have the court apply a statute of limitations that would
make the client's filing timely.5 Certainly, the attorney is not at fault
for trying to provide his client with his day in court.
Other times, the attorney is simply seeking a forum in which
awards are traditionally high or the juries are liberal or conservative,
depending on the client's position. Do his actions amount to forum
shopping? Of course. Should they be forbidden either on an ethical or
procedural level? Should the attorney use restraint and not seek the
more advantageous venue for his client? If so, the attorney could face
a malpractice claim from his client.6
But in spite of the phrase's pejorative connotation, forum shopping remains
popular.").
4. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 2, at 777; see also Weyman I. Lundquist, The
New Art of Forum Shopping, 11 LrrG. 21, 22 (Spring 1985) ("What is certain is
that it is naive-bordering on foolish-to fail to consider all options before filing
suit.").
5. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), discussed infra notes 81,
97-109 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
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This article discusses forum shopping and its place in the Ameri-
can judicial system. It defends forum shopping and those accused of
forum shopping to the extent that such shopping is done within the
procedural and ethical rules, and it considers some of the rules and
decisions that have addressed or discussed forum shopping. Further,
it calls on lawmakers-legislators and judges-to accept forum shop-
ping as simply a procedural part of litigation, when that forum shop-
ping takes place within the rules, and to eliminate what is deemed
unacceptable forum shopping by legislatively limiting alternative fo-
rums and judicially exercising the power to transfer cases to more con-
venient forums.
II. FORUM SHOPPING'S PLACE IN THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Attempts to extinguish the "danger of forum-shopping" 7 have been
only partially successful because forum shopping is an intrinsic part of
the American judicial system. Not only do venue options provided by
procedural rules allow forum shopping, but the structure of the judi-
cial system provides incentives to shop for a forum.8
The American judicial system comprises the federal court system
and the state court systems. These court systems were designed to
function independently of each other. Commenting on this indepen-
dence, the Court explained that the United States Constitution
recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States, inde-
pendence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.
Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in
no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically au-
thorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, ex-
cept as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that
extent, a denial of its independence. 9
Co-existing with this independence, however, are the instances in
which jurisdiction of the court systems overlaps, most notably brought
about by choices granted to litigants in diversity of citizenship cases.1 0
7. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987); Hohri
v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 240 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1986) vacated 482 U.S. 64
(1987); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. LaQuinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d
982, 991 (11th Cir. 1982).
8. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bank-
ruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 825-26 (1987) (recognizing the
incentive to forum shop once two different courts are available in which to litigate
disputes).
9. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (quoting Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over "all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between - (1) citizens of different States .... " 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
[Vol. 78:79
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Originally, diversity jurisdiction was created "to prevent apprehended
discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the
State." 1 Thus, forum shopping or venue selection was sanctioned in
those cases in which a litigant might have felt that he would not be
given a fair trial in a state forum.
Overlapping jurisdiction between the federal court system and a
state court system is not the only sanctioned means by which a liti-
gant can select a venue or forum shop. State venue provisions typi-
cally provide two or more alternative venues within a state in which a
suit may be filed.' 2 Additionally, specialty courts, like the federal
bankruptcy court, give litigants alternative forums in which to litigate
their disputes.13
In light of the potential venue choices provided to litigants under
the American judicial system and the governing laws, we should not
be surprised or dismayed at the fact that forum shopping has
thrived.14 On the other hand, lawmakers have the responsibility to
limit choices when those choices "render[ ] impossible equal protection
of the law."' 5
Several cases illustrate the extent to which forum shopping is part
of the American judicial system. In these cases, the courts attempted
to prevent forum shopping, but in each case the court prevented some
forum shopping while creating other opportunities for forum shop-
ping. One of the first cases to raise awareness about forum shopping
11. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-3-2 to -11 (1993); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 392-395.5
(West 1974 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 47.011 to .061 (West 1994); 735
ILL. CoBn'. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West 1992 & Supp 1992); LA. CODE CIv. PROC.
ANN. art. 42-83 (West 1960 & Supp 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 600.1605-
.1635 (West 1996); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-401 to -417 (Reissue 1995); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 503-508 (McKinney 1976 & Supp 1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-4-2 to -5
(1997); Tax Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (West Supp. 1999); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-261 to -263 (Michie 1992 & Supp 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4.12.010 to .025 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
Also, these provisions, in conjunction with personal jurisdiction requirements,
often provide litigants with opportunities to select from among the courts of dif-
ferent states. See generally Juenger, supra note 3, at 557-58 (recognizing that the
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), broadened
the potential for forum shopping by expanding state court jurisdiction over par-
ties and thus expanding plaintiffs' forum choices).
13. See Baird, supra note 8, at 826-28; see also infra notes 136-50 and accompanying
text.
14. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), discussed infra
notes 27-30 and accompanying text; see also J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts
and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) ("The
lack of uniformity in state substantive law, compounded by proliferation of state
long-arm statutes, has made forum-shopping, among both federal and state
courts, a national legal pastime.").
15. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
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is Swift v. Tyson.16 In Swift v. Tyson, the Court, interpreting section
34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,17 held that federal courts need
not follow state case law in diversity cases when the state cases are
based on general principles of commercial law and not on local statute
or "local usages of a fixed and permanent operation."' 8 The Court ex-
plained that state court decisions could be considered, but they were
not conclusive of state law because they were not the law themselves,
but were only evidence of what the laws were at a particular time.19
Following this decision, problems with uniformity arose between
state and federal court interpretations of state law and "general
law."20 These discrepancies in interpretation, as well as trouble deter-
mining the difference between general law and local law, caused un-
certainty among courts and litigants.2 ' The state courts and federal
courts each insisted on applying their own interpretations of common
law, which prevented uniformity of decisions between those of state
courts and those of federal courts purporting to apply the same com-
mon law.22 Thus, despite the Court's attempt to preserve state auton-
omy, the result of Swift was that it preserved federal court autonomy
to some extent and "prevented uniformity in the administration of the
law of the State."23
16. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
17. Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided: "[Tihe laws of the sev-
eral states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they ap-
ply." Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)).
18. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
19. See id.
20. The scope of the term "general law" was wide and included commercial law,
obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within the
State, the extent to which a carrier operating within a State may stipu-
late for exemption from liability for his own negligence or that of his
employee; the liability for torts committed within the State upon persons
resident or property located there, even where the question of liability
depended upon the scope of a property right conferred by the State; and
the right to exemplary or punitive damages. Furthermore, state deci-
sions construing local deeds, mineral conveyances, and even devises of
real estate were disregarded.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) (footnotes omitted); see also
Corr, supra note 3, at 1091-92 (discussing Justice Brandeis' reasons for overrul-
ing Swift).
21. See Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 74; see also id. at 69 n.1 & 74 n.5, for a listing of
several cases and articles that had questioned the decision in Swift.
22. See id. at 74.
23. Id. at 75; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (recognizing that
under Swift, there was a possibility that the result of a case could depend upon
whether it had been brought in state or federal court); Corr, supra note 3, at 1095
[Vol. 78:79
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The Court addressed the uncertainty resulting from Swift and
overruled Swift's interpretation of section 34 of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.24 In Erie, the Court
held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of the
forum state, whether that law is statutory or the case law of the high-
est state court, unless the matter is governed by the Constitution or a
specific act of Congress. 25 The Court intended to prevent vertical fo-
rum shopping, or forum shopping from state court to federal court
within the same state.2 6 This objective may have been achieved, how-
ever, it indirectly may have encouraged horizontal forum shopping
from state to state in search of favorable law.
The Court acknowledged this possibility in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.,27 a case in which the Court had to deter-
mine the appropriate conflicts of laws rules that a federal district
court sitting in Delaware should apply in a diversity case. After not-
ing that a Delaware state court would apply Delaware state law on
this issue, the Court held that Delaware state conflicts of laws rules
should also be applied by the federal district court.28 "Otherwise the
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal ad-
ministration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side."2 9 The Court recognized that this ruling might disturb
uniformity among federal courts in different states, but noted that
"[wihatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal
courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors."30
(arguing that the Swift Court was unrealistic in believing its rule would create
uniformity in state law administration).
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. See id. at 78.
26. See id. at 74-77; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467 ("The Erie rule is
rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of
a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal
court."); Corr, supra note 3, at 1091-92, 1115 (recognizing one of the reasons be-
hind Erie was to prevent forum shopping before state and federal courts); Wright,
supra note 14, at 317 (referring to the decision in Erie as "the celebrated federal
answer to forum shopping").
27. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see generally, Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie
and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REv. 79, 82 (1993).
28. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 1979) (commenting on
the Erie decision: "he decision to require that federal courts apply state substan-
tive law in diversity cases represented a preference for vertical uniformity of sub-
stantive law within each state over horizontal uniformity among federal courts
nationwide." (quoting Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160,
164 (3d Cir. 1976))).
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Another case which illustrates that forum shopping is an intrinsic
part of the American judicial system is found in the Court's opinion
and the dissenting opinion in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.3 1 At issue in Stewart was whether a federal court, sitting in
diversity, should apply state or federal law in adjudicating a motion to
transfer to a venue designated by the parties in a forum-selection
clause of their contract.3 2 The contract between the parties provided
that litigation arising out of the contract shall be brought in a court in
New York, New York.3 3 Despite this provision, one of the parties, an
Alabama corporation, filed a suit arising out of the contract in federal
court in Alabama. In response, the defendant moved for the court to
transfer the case to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a),3 4 specifically relying on the forum selection clause to
support the transfer.35
The district court applied Alabama law, which disfavors forum se-
lection clauses, and denied the motion with no analysis of the merits
of the transfer. 36 Had the court applied the applicable federal law, 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court would have been required to evaluate the
transfer motion in light of the convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses and the interest of justice, and the motion might have been
granted. In fact, on appeal, the Supreme Court held that a district
court must apply federal law when that law is a federal statute that
controls the issue and the statute is a "valid exercise of Congress' con-
stitutional powers."3 7 Thus, the district court was bound to apply
§ 1404(a) to the venue dispute in this case.38
The Court's decision should discourage horizontal forum shopping
within the federal system, or forum shopping from federal court in one
state to federal court in another state, by requiring that all federal
courts faced with similar issues apply federal law, thereby taking
away the incentive for plaintiffs like the one in Stewart to seek out
venues with law favorable to their positions. On the other hand, this
decision may promote vertical forum shopping, or forum shopping
31. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
32. See id. at 24.
33. See id. at 24 n.1.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) provides: "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." See also infra
text accompanying notes 82-86.
35. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24. In the alternative, defendant moved for dismissal of
the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The district court
denied the motion in its entirety, then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal.
See id. The parties did not appeal the ruling with respect to the motion to dis-
miss. See id. at 28 n.8.
36. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
37. Id. at 27.
38. See id. at 28.
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from state court to federal court, because of the difference that would
result in each venue. If the parties can overcome a removal of the case
to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, then they can ensure
that the state's law, in this case, Alabama law, would apply. The les-
son to be learned by the plaintiff in this case is that it should have
filed suit in state court originally to ensure that Alabama state law
would apply and to avoid application of § 1404(a).39
Justice Scalia explained in his dissent in Stewart that the Court
was letting § 1404(a) interfere with or preempt state contract law.4 0
Further, he explained:
Venue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with
which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit might well
not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly less convenient
forum. Transfer to such a less desirable forum is, therefore, of sufficient im-
port that plaintiffs will base their decisions on the likelihood of that eventual-
ity when they are choosing whether to sue in state or federal court. With
respect to forum-selection clauses, in a State with law unfavorable to validity,
plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a clause will be encouraged to sue in
state court, and nonresident defendants will be encouraged to shop for more
favorable law by removing to federal court. In a reverse situation-where a
State has law favorable to enforcing such clauses-plaintiffs will be en-
couraged to sue in federal court.4 1
Working within judicial systems that provide such options, attor-
neys are bound to consider these options when evaluating their cli-
ents' lawsuits. In fact, these options are the necessary consequences
of having independence between the state and federal judicial
systems.
III. WHAT CONGRESS AND THE COURTS HAVE SAID ABOUT
FORUM SHOPPING
Despite the fact that forum shopping is allowed and facilitated by
the American judicial system, Congress and the courts have generally
disparaged the practice of forum shopping, tolerating it at times when
39. See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1998) (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
40. Id. at 36 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
41. Id. at 39-40 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Commenting on Justice Scalia's dissent, one
commentator remarked, "Preventing intrastate forum shopping only encourages
interstate forum shopping. As long as the states have different rules on this sub-
ject, sophisticated litigants will travel to the state in which the law is most
favorable." Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L.
REv. 55, 96 (1992).
In response to Stewart and other cases on enforceability of selection clauses,
Professor Borchers explained, "the only way to discourage interstate forum shop-
ping is to develop uniform rules that transcend state lines. Requiring federal
courts to adhere to the same rule is a substantial step in this direction." Id.
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other interests are at stake.42 Thus, defending the practice may ap-
pear to be insupportable. However, consideration of the relevant stat-
utes and cases reveals that forum shopping is allowed by law, and it
can be and has been limited by statute when that is felt to be in the
interest of justice.
A. Forum Shopping to Select the Applicable Law
A review of reported cases in which forum shopping has been dis-
cussed 43 reveals that the most common motive for forum shopping is
selection of the law to be applied to the case. Parties in the cases dis-
cussed herein sought to select the applicable law to determine recover-
able damages, 44 a party's capacity to sue,4 5 the statute of
limitations, 46 child custody,47 and the division of community
property.48
1. Forum Shopping to Dictate Recoverable Damages
The first case considered is Nolan v. Boeing Co.49 Nolan presents
an example of several forum shopping moves made by both plaintiffs
and defendants seeking to control the law to be applied to the case
and, consequently, to determine the recoverable damages. Interest-
ingly, despite the jockeying back and forth between state and federal
court in this case, the federal court recognized the legitimacy of forum
shopping when that shopping is done within the procedural rules.50
Nolan is a case that arose from the crash in England of a British
Midland Airways aircraft that was en route from London, England to
42. Courts often refer to the twin aims of Erie: "discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." See, e.g., Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
43. Discussion is limited to reported cases, but it must be acknowledged that forum
shopping or venue selection occurs every time an attorney files a lawsuit, consid-
ers filing a lawsuit, or responds to a lawsuit. In each of these instances the attor-
ney evaluates the venue in terms of whether it is a proper venue and whether a
more favorable venue is available. The majority of these cases are either not re-
ported or venue has not been raised as a point of contention.
An interesting study of forum shopping in the bankruptcy context examines
bankruptcy filings in which forum shopping was not an issue raised during litiga-
tion, but from which a very definite pattern of forum shopping was found. See
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 12, discussed infra notes 136-50.
44. See infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 80, 83, 87-96 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 81, 97-117 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 120-30.
48. See infra notes 121, 131-34.
49. 762 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. La. 1989), affd 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Nolan v. Boeing Co., 736 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. La. 1990); Nolan v. Boeing Co., 715 F.
Supp. 152 (E.D. La. 1989). The author was one of the attorneys who represented
defendants in these actions.
50. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1990).
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Belfast, Northern Ireland. The named plaintiffs were two American
attorneys from Washington and New York who had no relationship to
the crash. However, they had petitioned a Louisiana court and were
appointed to act as representatives for 126 non-American individuals
who were seeking recovery based on the accident.51 Plaintiffs and
their representatives wished to have their cases tried in the United
States, in particular, in Louisiana state court, so that they could take
advantage of Louisiana law and the higher damage awards usually
given in the United States.52 Defendants wanted to have the case
heard in federal court so they could be sure that the court would apply
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and dismiss the case.5 3
The first move in Nolan was for the two American attorneys, Nolan
and Judkins, to have themselves appointed representatives of the var-
ious victims of the crash by a Louisiana state court, which they did
shortly after the crash. These attorneys then filed suits in Louisiana
state court for the represented parties, none of whom was an Ameri-
can citizen or resident. Suit was filed relatively quickly, within four
months of the crash, because plaintiffs were trying to avoid removal to
federal court under a revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), which would take
effect on May 18, 1989, five months after the crash.54
What plaintiffs sought to avoid was a removal based on the federal
court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Section 1332(a) of Title
2855 grants the federal courts diversity jurisdiction, that is, jurisdic-
tion of civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds the
51. See id. at 1060-61.
52. Plaintiffs admitted that the representatives were chosen and the appointments
secured to avoid diversity of citizenship and prevent removal of the case to fed-
eral court. See id. at 1061. Plaintiffs also knew that Louisiana law does not in-
corporate the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Thus, the case
would not likely be dismissed by a Louisiana state court. See Fox v. Board of
Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978, 989-91 (La. 1991); see also Michael J. Maloney and
Allison Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation:
'Where Angels Fear to Tread," 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 933, 950 & n.61 (1995) ("F]iling
in the United States is usually in the client's best interest ... because the United
States litigation system offers advantages to the plaintiff which are virtually un-
paralleled around the world.").
53. See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061.
54. See id. at 1060.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1998). Section 1332(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff
and citizens of a State or of different States.
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sum of $75,000 and the parties are geographically diverse. Section
1332(c) prescribes the citizenships to be assigned to different types of
parties.5 6 Subpart (c) was amended in 1988 specifically to reduce the
power given to plaintiffs to forum shop through representatives. 57
Prior to the amendment, the citizenship of a represented person or
estate was determined based on the citizenship of the representa-
tive.5 8 This allowed potential litigants to expand or constrict the list
of potential venues by selecting their representatives based on the
representatives' citizenship. Thus, if a potential litigant wanted to
limit venues, such as preventing removal from a state court based on
diversity of citizenship, the potential litigant could simply have a rep-
resentative appointed who was not diverse to the defendant. Removal
in this situation was prevented under the old law even if the defend-
ant was diverse to the person represented. Likewise, if a potential
litigant wanted to ensure a federal forum, he could have a person
named as the representative who was diverse to the defendant. Com-
mentary on the 1988 revision to § 1332 notes that the previous inter-
pretation left "too much power on the decedent's side to arrange things
to suit its own choice-of-forum preferences."59
In Nolan, the representative plaintiffs were citizens of Washington
and New York.60 Defendants included The Boeing Company, a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Washington;
General Electric Company, a New York corporation with its principal
place of business in New York; and CFM International, Inc., a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio.61 Thus,
under the version of 1332(c) effective in April 1989, diversity was de-
stroyed because the representatives' citizenships were not diverse to
two of the three defendants.
56. Section 1332(c) provides:
For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title -
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business, except that in any direct action
against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the in-
sured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as
well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated
and of the State where it has its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent,
and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.
57. See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186 (1931).
59. See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1998 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993).
60. See Nolan, 919 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1990).
61. See id.
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When defendants fied a Notice of Removal with the federal court,
plaintiffs responded by filing a Motion to Remand, relying upon
§ 1332(c) as it existed prior to the 1988 amendment. After considering
the lack of diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants, the court
granted the motion to remand.62
Although the rule has been amended that allowed the representa-
tive's citizenship to be the citizenship considered for diversity pur-
poses,63 this one change in § 1332 has not eliminated forum shopping
in this type of case, nor did it stop the parties in Nolan. With the
plaintiffs back in state court in Nolan, defendants had to find a way to
get back to federal court or to some court that would apply the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens and dismiss the case to be filed in a
more convenient forum outside of the United States.64 Defendants
were now in the position of having to "shop" for a better venue in
which to have these cases tried. Boeing, one of the defendants, filed a
third-party demand against a company owned by the French govern-
ment.65 Anticipating a Notice of Removal by the French sovereign
pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)66 and 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d),67 plaintiffs moved to "sever" the third-party demand
from the principal demand. The state court granted the motion and
62. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 715 F. Supp. 152, 155 (E.D. La. 1989).
63. The amendment now requires that the court consider the citizenship of the per-
son or estate represented, thus taking away some of the plaintiffs ability to shop
for a forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. I. 1996).
64. Louisiana law does not recognize the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. See Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978, 991 (La. 1991). The
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss a case in
favor of a more convenient foreign forum when the more convenient forum would
have jurisdiction over the case. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 447-48 (1994); see also Juenger, supra note 3, at 555-56 (referring to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens as a "broadly gauged anti-forum-shopping
device").
To determine whether a dismissal in favor of another jurisdiction is appropri-
ate, the court should consider both private and public interest factors, including
"the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, wit-
nesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action;
and all other practical problems that make trial easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive," as well as administrative difficulties that might result, the local interest of
a people in having "localized controversies decided at home," and the benefits of
having a court familiar with the applicable law apply that law. American Dredg-
ing Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 448 (1994) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)).
65. See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061.
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
67. Section 1441(d) provides in pertinent part: "Any civil action brought in a State
court against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be
removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
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severed the third-party demand, but only to the extent that the ac-
tions were "severed" for trial purposes. 68
The third-party foreign defendant then removed the entire case to
federal court based on the FSIA and § 1441(d). The case was once
again in federal court where the defendants could seek a dismissal
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In response, plaintiffs
sought a remand on the grounds that the third-party defendant could
only remove the third-party demands, not the entire action. In the
alternative, and despite all of the jockeying that plaintiffs themselves
had already performed, plaintiffs argued that defendants may have
improperly colluded to create removal jurisdiction.69 "28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 provides that a district court 'shall not have jurisdiction of a
civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of
such court.'" 70 Ironically, "[tihe purpose of the statute is to prevent
the manipulation of jurisdictional facts where none existed before-for
example, through collusive assignments from a non-diverse party to a
diverse party."7 1
The court held that the removal was proper, interpreting § 1441(d)
to allow a foreign sovereign to remove an entire action, not just iso-
lated claims against the foreign sovereign.7 2 Addressing the argu-
ment that the defendants may have improperly colluded with each
other to create diversity jurisdiction, the court found the argument
"frivolous."73 The court found that Boeing had a substantial claim
against the foreign company. 74 Further, the court noted that "parties
may legitimately try to obtain the jurisdiction of federal courts, as
68. See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1067.
69. See id. at 1061.
70. Id. at 1067 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994)).
71. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359, Historical Notes (1994); Sowell v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 453-54 (1925) (The original purpose and effect of the assignee
clause of the section "were to prevent the conferring of jurisdiction on the federal
courts, on grounds of diversity of citizenship, by assignment, in cases where it
would not otherwise exist, and not to deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
where it was conferred on grounds other than diversity of citizenship."); Yokeno
v. Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 1992). Section 1359 is also meant to pre-
vent parties from "artificially" leaving other parties out of litigation in order to
invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. See U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Constr.
Co., 860 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1988).
The injured parties in Nolan, in fact, had done just the opposite of what the
statute was meant to prevent by selecting "non-diverse" representatives; they
had colluded to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
72. See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1064, 1066; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Rose-
lawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 941-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
§ 1441(d) authorizes removal of the entire action and not just those claims
against the foreign sovereign).
73. See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1067.
74. See id. at 1067-68.
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long as they lawfully qualify under some of the grounds that allow
access to this forum of limited jurisdiction."75 "[A] party's motive in
preferring a federal tribunal is immaterial."76 Thus, despite the bla-
tant forum shopping for favorable law, the Nolan court acknowledged
the legitimacy of forum shopping when that shopping is done within
the rules.77
2. Forum Shopping to Ensure Capacity to Sue
In Van Dusen v. Barrack78 and Ferens v. John Deere Co.79 choice of
law was also the motivation for forum shopping. In Van Dusen, plain-
tiffs sought application of a particular state's law to ensure their ca-
pacity to sue.8 0 In Ferens, plaintiffs sought application of a particular
state's law to ensure that their claim had not been prescribed.8 1 In
both cases, the parties relied on the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), in an attempt to control the law to be applied to the cases.
Section 1404(a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides:
"[F]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of jus-
tice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought."8 2 The Court in Van
Dusen explained, "Section 1404(a) reflects an increased desire to have
federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called for in
the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice."83
"[Tihe purpose of the section is to prevent the waste 'of time, energy
and money' and 'to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against
unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'"8 4 Ironically, § 1404(a) was
75. Id. at 1068 (quoting U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. MD Constr. Co., 860 F.2d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 1988)).
76. Id. (citing Chicago v. Mills, 204 U.S. 321, 330 (1907)).
77. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778-79 (1984) (recognizing
implicitly a litigant's right to search for a forum with a favorable statute of limi-
tations when the forum had personal jurisdiction over the parties); Goad v. Celo-
tex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that statutes
governing venue and jurisdiction in diversity cases represent "approval of alter-
nate forums for plaintiffs," and also commenting that complaints about forum
shopping should be directed to Congress, who has enacted statutes giving liti-
gants venue choices).
78. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
79. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
80. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 613-15.
81. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1994).
83. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (citing Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32
(1955)).
84. Id. (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)).
See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 1507, 1515-16 (1995), in which the authors con-
clude that transfer shifts the choice of venue from plaintiff to judge when the
interest of justice dictates.
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enacted to discourage forum shopping by plaintiffs from federal court
to federal court.8 5 What it has become after the Van Dusen and Fer-
ens decisions is a statute that allows plaintiffs to capture the state law
they would like applied to their cases, then have their cases trans-
ferred to a more convenient forum for trial.s6
The suit in Van Dusen arose from injuries and deaths resulting
from the crash of an airplane shortly after takeoff from a Massachu-
setts airport.8 7 The plane was bound for Pennsylvania.8 S Forty-five
plaintiffs filed suit in Pennsylvania, rather than Massachusetts, be-
cause they did not qualify under Massachusetts law to sue as repre-
sentatives of the decedents. Other plaintiffs brought suit in
Massachusetts.8 9 Defendants moved to transfer the actions from
Pennsylvania to Massachusetts based on § 1404(a). 9 0 Plaintiffs
fought the transfer, arguing that the transfer and the resulting appli-
cation of Massachusetts law would more than likely defeat the plain-
tiffs' capacity to serve as representatives and would limit the type of
damages recoverable.9 1
The Court was unwilling to allow plaintiffs to defeat a transfer to
an otherwise more convenient forum and to control venue by not qual-
ifying to proceed in that venue.92 At the same time, the Court was
unwilling to allow the defendants to use § 1404(a) as a "forum shop-
ping instrument."9 3 Therefore, the Court held that the law to be ap-
plied by the transferor court would be the law applied by the
transferee court. 94 Moreover, commenting on the statute's role, the
Court explained that § 1404(a) should be seen merely as a "judicial
housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the
federal courts."9 5 The Court explained:
There is nothing, however, in the language or policy of § 1404(a) to justify its
use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to plaintiffs who have
chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a proper venue.
... §1404(a) was not designed to narrow the plaintiffs venue privilege or to
defeat the state-law advantages that might accrue from the exercise of this
85. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 612, 636; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Historical Notes (1994)
("Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue
is proper."); see also Michael Rodden, Is 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) A Federal Forum
Shopping Statute?, 66 WASH. L. REv. 851, 854-55, 870 (1991).
86. See Zurich Reinsurance (UK) Ltd. v. York Int'l Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-539 (JEI),
1998 WL 226298, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 1998).
87. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 613.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 614.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 626.
92. See id. at 623-24.
93. Id. at 634-36.
94. See id. at 639.
95. Id. at 636.
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venue privilege but rather the provision was simply to counteract the inconve-
niences that flowed from the venue statutes by permitting transfer to a conve-
nient federal court.9 6
3. Forum Shopping to Determine Applicable Statutes
of Limitations
The Court expanded this holding in Ferens v. John Deere Co.9 7
when it allowed plaintiffs to seek a transfer and held that the trans-
feree court's choice of law rules would apply in the transferor court.
The plaintiffs in Ferens not only selected an "inconvenient" forum, but
moved for a transfer of the case to a more convenient forum under
§ 1404(a) shortly after the case was filed.98 Thus, the plaintiffs were
able to secure the favorable law from one jurisdiction, then move the
case to the preferred jurisdiction.
In Ferens, the plaintiff was injured in Pennsylvania by a product
manufactured by a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois.99 Although the plaintiffs timely filed their con-
tract and warranty claims against the defendant in Pennsylvania fed-
eral court based on diversity jurisdiction, they did not timely file their
tort claims in Pennsylvania; more than two years had passed since
the incident, and Pennsylvania had a two-year statute of limitations
on tort claims.10 0 After searching for a state with a longer statute of
limitations and a state whose courts would have jurisdiction over the
defendant, plaintiffs filed a tort action in federal court in Mississippi.
Mississippi had a six-year statute of limitations and was a state in
which the defendant conducted business.1 0 1
The plaintiffs then moved to transfer the case to Pennsylvania pur-
suant to § 1404(a), asserting that Pennsylvania was a more conve-
nient forum in which to try the case. 0 2 The Court recognized
plaintiffs' actions as forum shopping, commenting that the "Ferenses
took their forum shopping a step further" when they sought the trans-
fer.103 The plaintiffs did not disguise the fact that they had filed in
96. Id. at 633-35.
97. 494 U.S. at 519.
98. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519-20.
99. See id. at 519.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 519-20.
102. See id. at 520.
103. Id. Interestingly, the Ferenses argued in support of their motion that:
they resided in Pennsylvania; that the accident occurred there; that the
claim had no connection to Mississippi; that a substantial number of wit-
nesses resided in the Western District of Pennsylvania but none resided
in Mississippi; that most of the documentary evidence was located in the
Western District of Pennsylvania but none was located in Mississippi;
and that the warranty action pending in the Western District of Penn-
sylvania presented common questions of law and fact.
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Mississippi solely to take advantage of Mississippi's statute of
limitations. 0 4
The Court explained that the policy behind § 1404(a) was based on
the Erie decision and the principle that "for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead
of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially
different result."10 5 This principle, coupled with the recognition that
the plaintiff always has the opportunity to shop for a forum with
favorable law, supported the Court's decision in Ferens.0 6 Thus, the
Ferens Court essentially balanced the advantages and disadvantages
to each of the parties that would result from its decision and concluded
that allowing plaintiffs some latitude to forum shop was the best way
to continue the policies set forth in earlier cases.
The four dissenters in Ferens were not afraid to recognize the bal-
ancing that had taken place. They commented:
[Jiust as it is unlikely that Congress, in enacting § 1404(a), meant to provide
the defendant with a vehicle by which to manipulate in his favor the substan-
tive law to be applied in a diversity case, so too is it unlikely that Congress
meant to provide the plaintiff with a vehicle by which to appropriate the law
of a distant and inconvenient forum in which he does not intend to litigate,
and to carry that prize back to the State in which he wishes to try the case.
1 0 7
Further, the dissenters pointed out that the decision would also pro-
mote forum shopping from state to federal court because parties would
choose the federal court forum over the state court forum to ensure the
opportunity to have the federal court apply a different state's substan-
tive law.O8 The dissenters urged the Court not to allow the plaintiff
to engage in such blatant law shopping. 0 9
Another circumstance in which the courts have, at times, recog-
nized and tolerated the potential for forum shopping in search of
favorable law involves the application of federal statutes that do not
have their own statutes of limitation.' 10 At issue in North Star Steel
v. Thomasll was the appropriate limitations period for an action
Id.
104. See id. at 519-20.
105. Id. at 524 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
106. See id. at 524-28.
107. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Zurich Reinsurance (UK) Ltd. v. York
International Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-539 (JEI) 1998 WL 226298, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr.
29, 1998), in which the court recognized a plaintiffs right to select the applicable
law. Plaintifffiled suit in New Jersey state court and was able to take advantage
of favorable New Jersey law even though the suit was removed to federal court
and transferred to a federal court in Louisiana, the state where the incident at
issue took place. The court explained that the court "must respect Zurich's choice
of New Jersey law." Id.
110. See, e.g., North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1995).
111. 515 U.S. 29 (1995).
[Vol. 78:79
IN DEFENSE OF FORUM SHOPPING
brought under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act (WARN),112 a federal statute meant to protect workers from being
laid off without at least sixty days notice.
Before ruling that the court should borrow a limitations period
from a comparable state statute, the Court weighed the consequences
of following the tradition of borrowing state statutes in these circum-
stances, against the argument that such a ruling would encourage fo-
rum shopping.1'3 The court reasoned that, although "the practice of
adopting state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action can
result in different limitations periods in different states for the same
federal action," and although "some plaintiffs will canvass the varia-
tions and shop around for a forum,... these are just the costs of the
rule itself, and nothing about WARN makes them exorbitant."1' 4 The
Court distinguished cases arising under WARN, which usually arise
from layoffs at a single site of employment, from multi-state claims,
such as those arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO).115
The Court selected a uniform statute of limitations to be applied in
RICO cases in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc.,116 and selected a uniform statute of limitations to be applied to
§ 10(b) actions in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbert-
son.lT7 Explaining its decision in Lampf concerning the § 10(b) ac-
tions, the Court reasoned:
The multi-state nature of the [federal cause of action at issue] indicates the
desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of
multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger
of forum shopping and, at the very least, would 'virtually guarante[e] ... com-
plex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward
matter.'1 1 8
These cases involving federal statutory law and the reasoning be-
hind them illustrate well the delicate balance the courts have tried to
strike between uniformity among the federal courts and uniformity
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
113. See North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 32-33 (citing Automobile Workers v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966) and Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)).
114. Id. at 36.
115. Id. at 36-37 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994)).
116. 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
117. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). Congress attemped to supercede Lampf by statute, see 15
U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b), but that section was found unconstitutional in Plant v. Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
118. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357 (alterations in original)(citation omitted)(quoting Report
of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law 392 (1985)). Of course, to avoid the question of which statute
of limitations to apply when a federal statute is at issue and to discourage forum
shopping, Congress could enact a statute of limitations as part of the statute.
See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1994).
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
among the courts operating within a state. When the likelihood is
that a case arising under a federal statute will involve citizens of dif-
ferent states and acts occurring in different states, the Court favors a
uniform statute of limitations to prevent forum shopping from state to
state. However, when the risk of multi-state litigation is low, the
Court favors uniformity between the law that a state court would ap-
ply and the law that a federal court in that state would apply.
4. Forum Shopping for Favorable Custody and Divorce Laws
In the area of family law, almost all litigation takes place in state
court.1 1 9 Thus, the forum shopping that takes place in family law
cases is horizontal forum shopping, that is, shopping from one state
court to another state court. Each state has its own law in this area
and has its own venue provisions. However, because family law cases
often involve ongoing relationships, they often lack the finality typical
in other types of litigation. This lack of finality opens the door for
forum shopping even after an issue has been litigated in one state
court.120
After many years of forum shopping in the areas of family law and
community property law, Congress enacted the Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)12i and the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA)122 to curb forum shopping prac-
tices.1 2 3 A section of the PKPA imposes a duty on state courts to en-
force child custody determinations entered by courts of another state
if the decree is consistent with the Act, that is, if the court had juris-
diction over the child consistent with the PKPA.124 If jurisdiction ex-
ists, no other state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
dispute.1 2 5 "[O]ne of the chief purposes of the PKPA is to 'avoid juris-
dictional competition and conflict between State courts.'" 12 6
119. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); In re Bur-
rus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Franz v. United States, 712 F.2d 1428, 1435
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child:
A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 845, 849, 915 (1992).
120. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988).
121. Pub. L. No. 96-611 §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568-73 (1980) (codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The PKPA is the federal version of the UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1988), which has been
adopted by every state. See Goldstein, supra note 118, at 849, 915.
122. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1994).
123. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177 (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(5), 94 Stat.
3569 (1980)); Goldstein, supra note 119, at 853-54.
124. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 175-76 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994)).
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1994).
126. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177 (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(5), 94 Stat. 3569
(1980)).
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The Court had an opportunity to comment on the PKPA in Thomp-
son v. Thompson, in which it was asked to determine whether the
PKPA provides a private right of action in federal court to rule on the
validity of two conflicting custody decrees from different states.12 7
The Court held that it does not.12s Reviewing the history of child cus-
tody law, the court recognized that child custody orders lack the final-
ity of most judgments because courts in other states can modify these
orders at any time, in the best interests of the child.129 The result was
that parents would kidnap their children and take the children to an-
other state seeking a ruling on child custody more favorable to them
than the one they received from the initial state in which the case was
filed.130 Congress' intent in enacting the PKPA was to eliminate this
type of incentive to forum shop.131
Similar to the PKPA, the USFSPA "prevents spouses from forum
shopping for a State with favorable divorce laws."132 Mansell v. Man-
sell133 involved the application and interpretation of the USFSPA.134
The Court explained that the Act dictates what military pay should be
treated as community property, it provides a mechanism for distribut-
ing pay directly to a former spouse, and it preempts state law on this
topic, thus doing away with the incentive to shop for favorable law.135
B. Forum Shopping in Search of Favorable Interpretation
and Application of the Law
Litigants not only seek courts that will apply law favorable to their
positions, but they also seek courts that are most likely to interpret
and apply the law in a way that is favorable to their positions. An
area of litigation governed by federal law in which litigants have
sought a favorable interpretation and application of the law is the
area of bankruptcy. Debtors have sought out those forums in which
bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings tend to run smoothly for
debtors.136 This type of shopping is analogous to the venue selection
process that every plaintiffs attorney goes through before filing a law-
suit, when the attorney is simply selecting from among several venues
within a state. The one significant exception to the analogy is that in
127. See id. at 174.
128. See id. at 179.
129. See id. at 180.
130. See id. at 182.
131. See id. at 181-82. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the PKPA and the
UCCJA, see Goldstein, supra note 119.
132. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 591 (1989).
133. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
134. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
135. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 590-92.
136. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1.
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the bankruptcy arena, the debtors have some control over selecting
which venues they would like in their list of options.1 3 7
The fact that companies wishing to file for bankruptcy and reor-
ganization frequently shop for the most favorable forum in which to do
so was brought to light by Professors LoPucki and Whitford after they
studied the bankruptcy reorganizations of forty-three large, publicly-
held companies.3s In their article, they report that companies often
focused on a court's record on ruling on extensions of exclusivity and
on regulation of attorneys' fees in selecting a forun. 13 9 This shopping
has allowed petitioners to shape the outcome of their cases to some
extent, despite the fact that the same federal law is being applied to
all of the cases regardless of which court is deciding the case. i 40
Professors LoPucki and Whitford found that most often the compa-
nies studied chose to file in New York City, despite, in what they re-
ferred to as a "substantial minority" of the cases, a lack of physical
presence in the city.i4 i Companies were able to select New York City
and other jurisdictions relatively easily because the venue provision in
the Bankruptcy Code and case precedent give debtors a choice of fo-
rums in which to file for bankruptcy, and changing or adding to the
possible forums available under the statute is not difficult.142
Permissible forums for filing for bankruptcy and reorganization in-
clude the following: (1) the district in which the debtor is incorporated;
(2) the district in which the debtor keeps his principal assets in the
United States; (3) the district in which the debtor has its principal
place of business; (4) a district in which a case concerning an affiliate
of the debtor is pending; and (5) any district when the parties have
expressly or by conduct waived objections to venue.1 4 3
137. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
138. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1.
139. See id. at 12.
140. See id. at 13 ("Although bankruptcy cases are governed by federal law that theo-
retically mandates the same outcome regardless of the district in which the case
happens to be brought, earlier studies of bankruptcy administration have estab-
lished the existence of substantial, outcome determinative differences in the
manner in which the law is applied from district to district." (citing KAREN GRoss,
PERCEPTION AND REALTrrY: AMERCAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE SURVEY ON SE-
LECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 1984 AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (1987);
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., PERSISTENCE OF COMIMUNITY: LOCAL VARIATIONS IN A
NATIONAL BANKRuPrCY SYSTEM (1991); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET. AL., As WE FoR-
GIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRO-
CESS AND REFORM (1969); William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal
Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L. REV. 85 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki, Encouraging Repay-
ment Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 347, 349
(1981)).
141. See id. at 12.
142. See id. at 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994)).
143. See id.
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Should a company wish to file for bankruptcy in a particular dis-
trict because of its favorable rulings, it need only make a change or
two to satisfy one of the venues identified above before filing. For ex-
ample, Professors LoPucki and Whitford found that companies can
usually move their company headquarters to a desired venue easily
and that five of the companies studied had moved their headquarters
to the district in which they filed for bankruptcy shortly before
filing.144
Another tactic discussed by Professors LoPucki and Whitford is re-
ferred to as the "venue hook." A company files for bankruptcy on be-
half of one of its affiliated companies in a favorable district in which
venue is proper for the affiliate, then shortly thereafter fies on behalf
of the parent company.145 This particular venue rule provides corpo-
rate groups with an even wider choice of venues than is ordinarily
allowed.
This type of forum shopping within the federal court system would
ordinarily be frustrated by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which gives the court
the power to transfer a case to another federal court "for the conven-
ience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."'14 6 However,
the equivalent of this rule in the bankruptcy context, Bankruptcy Rule
1014(a)(2),147 provides that the court may only transfer the matter
under the above circumstances upon the motion of a party in inter-
est.148 Professors LoPucki and Whitford concluded that "[tihe dynam-
ics of a voluntary reorganization case filed by a large, publicly held
company make such a motion unlikely."149 They cited several reasons
for the lack of successful transfer motions, including the professional
and financial interests of the presiding judge and the attorneys in hav-
ing the case remain in the original venue, the lack of an organized
force to oppose the venue, and the expense of litigating the issue of
venue in a distant city.150 Thus, as long as the venue options exist for
the bankruptcy case, parties are able to, and will continue to forum
shop for favorable interpretations of federal law.
Additional examples of searching for favorable interpretations and
application of the law include those cases in which litigants attempt to
144. See id. at 18-19. Professors LoPucki and Whitford were unable to confirm the
motives behind the moving of headquarters to venues in which the companies
filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter, but the facts seem to indicate some forum
shopping. See id. at 19.
145. See id. at 21-22.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994); see supra notes 34 and 82-85 and accompanying text.
147. FED. R. BAxR. P. 1014(a)(2).
148. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1014 explains: 'Under this rule, a motion
by a party in interest is necessary. There is no provision for the court to act on its
own initiative."
149. LoPucki and Whitford, supra note 1, at 24.
150. See id. at 24-25.
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have their cases tried in certain venues because of the reputation of
the judges or juries in those venues. For example, plaintiffs in civil
suits frequently seek out those venues in which damage awards are
customarily high.51 Defendants often seek to move cases from such
venues and will seek to litigate in venues in which damage awards are
not so liberally conferred.' 52 Such shopping for a favorable interpre-
tation and application of the law is difficult to challenge because to
prove his case, the challenger must call into question the court and the
judicial system's ability to be impartial and evenhanded. Moreover,
unless the venue is improper, the parties' motives in selecting a venue
are usually not relevant.153
C. Forum Shopping by the "Potential Defendant" Before the
"Potential Plaintiff" Has Filed Suit
Selecting a venue has been referred to as the plaintiffs privi-
lege.154 In an effort to appropriate that privilege, "potential defend-
ants" have acted under the Declaratory Judgment Act.155 The
Declaratory Judgment Act enables a potential defendant to file suit
against the potential plaintiff to have his rights and liabilities as to
the potential plaintiff declared by the court.' 5 6 However, as the cases
discussed below demonstrate, the courts have recently taken steps to
foreclose forum shopping using this act. The courts have expressed a
strong anti-forum shopping sentiment, explaining that "[ulsing a de-
claratory judgment action to race to res judicata or to change forums is
thoroughly inconsistent with the purposes of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act and should not be countenanced."' 5 7
151. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 84, at 1508 n.1 (discussing examples
of plaintiffs seeking venues in certain south Texas counties where judges are
sympathetic and juries are generous (citing John MacCormack, Remote Venue:
Plaintiffs'Pick, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at 1, 1, 30, and Laurie P. Cohen, Lawyer
Gets Investors to Sue GE, Prudential in Poor Border Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
1994, at Al)).
152. See John MacCormack, Remote Venue: Plaintiffs' Pick, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994,
at 1, 1, 30 (discussing litigation brought against Prudential Securities Inc. and
General Electric Capital Corp. in Maverick County, Texas, where defendants at-
tempted to have the judge removed from the case and attempted to have the
venue changed).
153. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Under some procedural rules, a
transfer may be a viable option, in which case the challenger can focus on factors
such as convenience and avoid having to raise the venue's reputation as the sole
reason for challenging the venue selection. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), dis-
cussed supra, notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
154. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994).
156. See id.
157. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 777 n.7
(1993) (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 358 F. Supp. 327
(N.D. Tex.), affd, 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973); JAMEs W. MooRS, ET AL.,
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In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,15s the Court held that a federal court
has discretion as to whether to hear a declaratory judgment suit or
whether to stay or dismiss that suit in favor of a parallel state suit
filed by the "plaintiff' sometime after the federal suit.159 In support of
its decision, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, the appellate
court reasoned that "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that maintenance of this declaratory judgment action
would result in piecemeal adjudication of the coverage dispute and
would reward [defendant] London Underwriters's attempts to forum
shop."160 Thus, even though the "defendant" may be the first to the
courthouse of his choice to file a declaratory judgment action, the
"plaintiff," who might be unsatisfied with this choice, may have the
power to change the venue of the dispute simply by filing his own suit
in state court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has devel-
oped a six-factor test for courts to use when considering whether to
stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action fied in federal court.
This test includes at least three factors that appear to be directed at
curtailing forum shopping. The six factors include:
(1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in con-
troversy may be fully litigated,
(2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the
defendant,
(3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit,
(4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain
precedence in time or to change forums exist,
(5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and the
witnesses, and
(6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purpose of
judicial economy.16 1
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.08[5] (2d ed. 1991); CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2758 (2d ed. 1983)).
158. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
159. In Wilton, the appellants, London Underwriters (London), filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal court against appellees, Hill Group. Through the ac-
tion, London sought a declaration of their rights and liabilities under commercial
general liability policies after a verdict in a related case was entered against ap-
pellees and others. London had refused to defend and indemnify Hill Group in a
dispute over oil & gas property. London agreed to dismiss the declaratory judg-
ment action if Hill Group would notify it two weeks in advance of the filing of any
lawsuit by Hill against London. Hill Group notified London, and London filed a
second declaratory judgment action in federal district court. Subsequently, Hill
Group filed an action against London in state court. Hill Group also filed a mo-
tion for dismissal or for a stay in federal court. The court stayed the action,
which stay was upheld by the appellate court, Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 41 F.3d
934, 935 (5th Cir. 1994), and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Wilton,
515 U.S. at 284 (1995).
160. Wilton, 41 F.3d at 935.
161. Rowan Cos. v. Ainsworth, 5 F. Supp. 3d 420,422 (W.D. La. 1998) (quoting Travel-
ers, 996 F.2d at 778).
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Factors two and three require the court to evaluate the plaintiffs mo-
tive in bringing the declaratory judgment action to ensure that the
plaintiff did not file suit as part of a race to the courthouse or in an
effort to be the one to select the forum. Factor four requires the court
to consider the possible inequity that the true plaintiff would suffer
because of the action being brought in the chosen court.
Despite this strong and express desire to prevent forum shopping
using the Declaratory Judgment Act, one of the consequences of the
Act, when properly utilized, is that the party who ordinarily does not
have the power to select the forum in which to litigate will have that
power. To overcome an adverse result from application of the above
factors concerning forum shopping and to successfully maintain suits
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, potential defendants must
simply be able to prove the existence of some motive other than forum
shopping, such as the filing of the suit to "avoid multiple lawsuits in
numerous different forums"16 2 or the filing of the suit because the po-
tential defendant "was attempting to resolve the question of liability
within a reasonable time frame." 163 Because coming up with such
proof will not be difficult in some cases, potential defendants will prob-
ably continue to use this Act to select a forum, but will select carefully
so that they are able to withstand the scrutiny of the courts applying
the six-factor test.
For example, in a situation in which a potential defendant expects
to be sued by multiple plaintiffs, the potential defendant has a good
chance of succeeding in maintaining a declaratory judgment action by
asserting that the action was filed to avoid multiple lawsuits in nu-
merous different forums. This was the situation in Travelers Insur-
ance Co. 164 In Travelers, a dispute arose when Travelers discontinued
certain insurance coverage, leaving several insureds who had been di-
agnosed with terminal illnesses without insurance coverage.
Six insureds filed declaratory judgment actions in three different
state courts asking the courts to define their rights under the Travel-
ers' policy in light of a state statute that prohibited insurance compa-
nies from unilaterally terminating coverage to insureds after they
have been diagnosed with a terminal condition.' 6 5 In response to
these suits, Travelers filed its own declaratory judgment action in fed-
eral court in Louisiana in which it sought to bring all potential claim-
ants into one forum for litigation.' 6 6 After two years of litigation, all
parties resolved their differences with Travelers except for Ashley
Hurdle, one of the parties who had filed her own suit in state court
162. Travelers, 996 F.2d at 779.
163. Rowan, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 423.
164. See Travelers, 996 F.2d at 778-79.
165. See id. at 775 (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:228(A) (West Supp. 1993)).
166. See id.
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prior to Travelers' federal suit. The district court raised the issue of
abstention sua sponte, then dismissed the federal suit in favor of the
state court action.1 6 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
after applying the six-factor test set forth above.16 s The court focused
on the fact that Travelers had brought the action to avoid "a multiplic-
ity of suits in various forums"' 69 and explained that "[sluch a goal,
unlike that of changing forums or subverting the real plaintiffs ad-
vantage in state court, is entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Declaratory Judgment Act."170 The court also focused on the fact that
the plaintiff in the state case had not actively pursued litigation in
state court, while the litigation in federal court had been quite active
over the preceding two years.1 7
Thus, although the courts have limited the opportunity for forum
shopping using the Declaratory Judgment Act, windows of opportu-
nity still exist for doing so. The difference in this line of cases from
those previously discussed is that the courts have expressly stated
that forum shopping is "thoroughly inconsistent with the purposes of
the Declaratory Judgment Act and should not be countenanced."i72
IV. THE ETHICS OF FORUM SHOPPING AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF BEING SANCTIONED
A. The Ethics of Forum Shopping
As the above discussion demonstrates, attorneys often get mixed
signals about the proper way to proceed regarding venue selection.
For example, consider the attorney who represents a potential defend-
ant who is considering filing a declaratory judgment action on behalf
of his client. The court has explained that declaratory judgment ac-
tions should not be used to forum shop.173 If the attorney has a legiti-
mate reason for filing the Declaratory Judgment action, should he file
the action even though one of his reasons is selection of a favorable
forum for his client? No easy answer exists to this question. The ethi-
167. See id. at 776.
168. See id. at 777.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 777, 779.
172. Id. at 777 n.7 (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 358 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. Tex 1973)).
173. See id. (citing Dresser Indus., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 327; J~ms W. MOORE, ET AL.,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.08[5] (2d ed. 1991); CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2758 (2d ed. 1983)).
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cal rules that govern attorneys' behavior in this area are found in sec-
tion 3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.174
Rule 3.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a pro-
ceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a ba-
sis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."' 75 The scenario above assumes that in addition to forum shop-
ping, there exists a non-frivolous basis for filing the declaratory judg-
ment action, such as having the litigation settled in one suit in one
forum instead of having duplicative litigation in many forums. Argua-
bly, filing the declaratory judgment action in this case would be al-
lowed under Rule 3.1.
Comment 1 to Rule 3.1 directs that "[tlhe advocate has a duty to
use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also
a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and
substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may pro-
ceed."17 6 This comment describes well the pressures on the attorney
and illustrates why attorneys should not be and can not be expected to
refrain from forum shopping within the procedural rules when doing
so is in their client's best interest. This comment indicates that ac-
tions taken within the procedural and substantive rules for the benefit
of a client are ethical as long as they do not constitute an abuse of
legal procedure. In fact, in many cases, an attorney's ethical duty to
his client may include selecting a forum with little connection to the
events giving rise to a cause of action if that forum is an acceptable
forum under the law, despite the fact that the attorney may be ac-
cused of taking advantage of "loopholes" or "technicalities.177
Rule 3.3 may actually present the stickier issue for an attorney in
this situation. Rule 3.3(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1)
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal."178 The
attorney may violate this rule if his or the client's true motive in filing
a suit pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act is to forum shop, yet
174. The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates on August 2, 1983, to replace the MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Approximately forty jurisdictions have adopted the
Model Rules or substantial portions of them. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RAY D.
SIMON, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes & Standards 3 (1999). Canon 9 of the
MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, which counsels that "[a] lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety," and the ethical
considerations that follow it were, to some extent, assimilated into section 3 of
the MODEL RULES and the PREAMBLE TO THE MODEL RULES.
175. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1998).
176. Id. cmt. 1.
177. See Maloney & Blizzard, supra note 52, at 952 (quoting William J. Rochelle &
Harvey 0. Payne, The Struggle for Personal Understanding, 25 TEx. B.J. 109, 159
(1962), and citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1969)).
178. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1998).
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he represents to the court that the motive is to have the court decide
all related cases in one action. Thus, the attorney is faced with a situ-
ation in which two motives support his actions-one legitimate and
one declared improper by the courts. Many attorneys would resolve
this situation easily by representing to the court that the action was
filed to have the court decide all related cases in one action. Once this
is done, who can question this seemingly legitimate use of the Declar-
atory Judgment Act?
Is this an honest and ethical way to proceed? The comment to Rule
3.2, which rule addresses a lawyer's duty to "make reasonable efforts
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client," coun-
sels that "[it is not justification that similar conduct is often tolerated
by the bench and bar."179 Accordingly, the fact that many attorneys
would resolve the situation as mentioned above is not alone sufficient
justification for resolving the situation in that manner. The preamble
to the Model Rules recognizes that attorneys will face difficult ethical
problems and advises that "[s]uch issues must be resolved through the
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules."180
Is it practical to expect attorneys and their clients to forego the
possible benefit of a "favorable" forum for their litigation simply be-
cause two motivations support a legal maneuver, and one is not fa-
vored by the courts? For example, should a client be penalized
because his attorney is willing to admit that he first thought of filing a
declaratory judgment action to control selection of the forum, when in
fact a declaratory judgment action is the most expedient and efficient
way to proceed? Of course not. Moreover, the attorney's behavior
should not be considered unethical when he is proceeding within the
procedural and substantive limits of the law. Comment 1 to Rule 3.1,
which is quoted above, supports attorneys' efforts to forum shop when
the "shopping" is done with the intent of using "legal procedure for the
fullest benefit of the client's cause" and is not done to delay litigation
or to harass.8 1
Few ethical opinions or decisions were found in which an attorney
was disciplined for forum shopping or for attempting to forum shop.
Discipline has been reserved for those cases in which attorneys have
violated the governing procedural or substantive laws. One of these
opinions involves attorney abuse of legal procedure and focuses on the
attorney's intent. An Informal Opinion issued by the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics addresses the question of whether an attorney
who intentionally files suit in an improper venue is acting unethically,
when he does so with the hope of obtaining a default judgment against
179. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.2 cmt. (1998).
180. Id. at Preamble.
181. Id. Rule 3.1 cmt. 1.
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the defendant because the defendant is not located in the venue.18 2
The Committee opined that the practice would unquestionably be un-
ethical under Canon 15183 and Canon 30184 if it was done to harass
the defendant or to take advantage of the absence of the opposing
party in the county or venue.18 5
Thus, except in those cases in which attorneys have acted outside
of procedural and substantive law, attorneys should be assured that
they are acting ethically when they abide by the law in selecting a
forum. As was stated in the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, "In
the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense."1s 6
B. Sanctions for Forum Shopping
Despite the lack of any explicit ethical preclusion of forum shop-
ping, attorneys have been sanctioned for forum shopping when their
actions have violated statutes like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
which prohibits attorneys and parties from filing pleadings that result
"in an abuse of litigation or misuse of the court's process" or that in-
volve frivolous motions.18 7 The published cases in which attorneys
have been sanctioned for forum shopping have involved attorneys who
have shopped for better results for their clients after courts have ruled
against their clients. The attorneys have essentially ignored the rul-
ings of the original courts and have shopped for better results, not by
filing appeals, but by filing independent actions.
182. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1011 (1967).
183. Canon 15 provides, in part: "It is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane." ABA Comm. On
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1011 (quoting Canon 15 of the CANONS OF PRO-
FEssIONAL ETHICS). From 1908 through 1969, the Canons of Professional Ethics
set the standards to which attorneys in the United States were to aspire. See
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1995).
184. Canon 30 provides, in part: "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or
to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to in-
jure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong." ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1908).
185. ABA Comm. On Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1011 (1967). The question
posed to the ABA Committee regarded a situation in which an attorney had ex-
hibited a pattern of filing suits in improper venues. Id.
186. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
187. See, e.g., Y.J. Sons & Co. v. Anemone, Inc., 212 B.R. 793, 806 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing
FED. R. Civ. PROC. 11; Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc.,
841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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In re Marriage ofRichlS8 is a case in which a party was sanctioned
by a state court for apparent forum shopping because the shopping
was deemed to be an abuse of the judicial process.' 8 9 Plaintiff filed a
suit for divorce in Douglas County, Washington.190 The court entered
an order of divorce and entered a visitation schedule for the father and
the paternal grandparents.' 9 1 The court retained jurisdiction over
"the parenting plan to consider future issues regarding the visitation
rights."'19 2 Unhappy with the visitation awarded to her ex-husband
and his parents, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a reconsideration
of the plan by the Douglas County court.
Still unhappy with the plan, plaintiff filed a separate action in an-
other Washington county, Yakima County, in which she attempted to
obtain a better ruling on visitation. 93 She filed a "dependency ac-
tion," which is an action traditionally filed when the person with cus-
tody is allegedly abusing or neglecting the child, which was not the
case here.194 Thus, the Yakima county court dismissed the depen-
dency action.19 5 Moreover, the Yakima County Juvenile Court Com-
missioner, at the urging of the Washington State Attorney General's
Office, imposed monetary sanctions on plaintiff for what the Attorney
General's Office called "blatant forum shopping."'19 6 The appellate
court upheld the sanctions, which were imposed pursuant to the
State's version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which is directed
at deterring baseless filings and curbing abuses of the judicial sys-
tem.197 The court penalized plaintiff for attempting to thwart the
original court's orders by seeking a favorable ruling by another court.
Similar actions resulted in sanctions against the plaintiff and its
attorney in Y.J. Sons, Inc. v. Anemone, Inc.198 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against the defendant in state court over the terms of a contract. The
contract governed the sale of the defendant's business to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged that the business was not performing as well as had
been represented by the defendant.199 Defendant then filed a counter-
claim against plaintiff based on the promissory note between the par-
ties.20 0 After several state court rulings favorable to the defendant
concerning foreclosure and the subsequent attempt by the plaintiff to
188. 907 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
189. See id. at 1236.
190. See id. at 1235.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1236.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1235.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 1237 (citing WAsH. Cl. R. 11).
198. See Y.J. Sons & Co. v. Amemone, Inc., 212 B.R. 793, 803 (D.N.J. 1997).




sell the business to a third party, plaintiff filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy protection with the bankruptcy court and sought the bank-
ruptcy court's approval of the sale of the business pursuant to section
363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor to sell property
free and clear of liens under certain circumstances. 20 1 Not only did
the court decline to approve the sale, but it also granted motions filed
by the state court defendant to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding and
for sanctions against the petitioner.20 2 The court explained that "Y.J.
'had, in essence, forum shopped not being satisfied with the results of
the action that was before the Superior Court [and sought] a second
bite of the apple."' 20 3 Sanctions were awarded pursuant to Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011, which is the equivalent in bankruptcy proceedings
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.204
V. CONCLUSION
Despite statements disparaging the practice of forum shopping, the
United States Constitution sanctions a federal court system that ex-
ists concurrently with state court systems. Further, federal and state
legislatures have enacted laws that give litigants choices from among
201. See id. at 799 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994)). While the litigation was pending,
the court initially ordered the plaintiff to deposit the payments owed to defendant
for the business into an escrow account and the court prohibited defendant from
exercising any of its rights under the promissory note, including foreclosure,
without a court order. Subsequently, the court granted defendant's motion to ter-
minate the escrow account and allowed defendant to proceed with foreclosure
pursuant to the promissory note.
The plaintiff then entered into a contract with a third party to sell the busi-
ness, but moved the court to have the proceeds of the sale deposited into an es-
crow account until the litigation was concluded. Defendant opposed this motion,
and the court denied the motion. Moreover, defendant refused to issue a state-
ment vacating its security interest in the business, and the court refused to re-
quire such a statement, ordering plaintiff to pay the money directly to the
defendant. See id. at 797-98.
202. See id. at 799.
203. See id. at 803.
204. See id. at 805 (citing BANKR. RULE 9011 and FED. R. Crv. P. 11). But see Coast
Mfg. Co. v. Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), for an example of the denial
of sanctions under Rule 11 for forum shopping. In Keylon, plaintiff filed a suit in
federal court based on the court's diversity jurisdiction, after the defendant in the
federal suit had already filed a state court suit on the same action. Defendant
moved for a dismissal of the federal suit and for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
The court referred to the issue of sanctions as a "close question," but refused to
sanction the plaintiff. The court explained:
[it is understandable that litigants will do a small amount of artful con-
niving to gain access to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and for a long time such efforts have been tolerated. It is our duty to
protect the diversity jurisdiction from abuses of the sort attempted here.
In doing so, we need not become punitive.
Id. at 698.
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IN DEFENSE OF FORUM SHOPPING
forums within which to file suit, courts have recognized the legitimacy
of litigants seeking particular venues for the litigation of their dis-
putes, and ethical rules require attorneys to use rules and procedures
to the fullest benefit of their clients. In light of the options available
and the law to support studying the options before filing or defending
against a lawsuit, the practice of forum shopping should be recognized
as a legitimate practice and a legitimate use of procedure when proce-
dural rules are followed.
The legal profession should take an honest look at what it expects
of attorneys and litigants with regard to forum selection and should
restrict forum choices to the extent that exercising one's power of se-
lection is undesirable. The incentive to forum shop is created when-
ever a litigant has an option as to where to file his lawsuit,205 and
attorneys should not be expected to ignore such options.
Arguments against forum shopping that suggest that it is a waste
of time, money, and resources are certainly sound to some degree
when proponents are able to point to cases of outrageous forum shop-
ping when the parties and the court are involved in months of litiga-
tion simply to decide which court will litigate a case. However, careful
study of these cases reveals that the time spent litigating issues in-
volving the proper forum may not be so repugnant or undesirable.
Had the attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Ferens not shopped for a forum in
which to file suit, the Ferenses would have been deprived of an oppor-
tunity to recover for their personal injuries, despite the fact that one
legally existed; had the attorneys for the defendants in the Nolan
cases not fought to have the cases dismissed from courts in the United
States, United States courts would have ended up litigating these
cases, which had little connection to the United States. Moreover, the
American judicial system was not founded on the premise that justice
should be dispensed as quickly and as inexpensively as possible at the
expense of providing a just determination of the issues before the
court. 20 6
As long as venue choices exist, venue will potentially be an issue
that must be litigated by the courts, just like evidentiary issues are
litigated and other procedural issues are litigated. Sometimes litigat-
ing venue will be expensive and will occupy a good deal of the court's
time, while in most cases it will not be an issue. Venue is no different
from any other issue in a suit in terms of the attention it deserves and
the variations that will exist from one case to the next.
Some possible solutions for those who oppose forum shopping in-
clude legislatively restricting venue choices, either by limiting the pos-
205. See Baird, supra note 8, at 826-27.
206. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 1, which was amended in 1993 to provide that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
1999]
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sible venues or ranking the venue choices available,20 7 liberally
applying transfer provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and utiliz-
ing the doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss cases. Expecting
attorneys to ignore their clients' best interests by failing to select a
favorable venue when it is available is asking attorneys to commit
malpractice, a move that would be more undesirable than the "waste"
trying to be prevented.
207. For example, rather than providing plaintiffs in cases brought in federal court
with potentially three or four venue choices, as is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(1994 & Supp. II 1996), that statute could provide that suits shall be filed in
choice (a) if available, choice (b) if choice (a) is not available, and so on. A possible
drawback of such a ranking system is that choice (a) may be available, but may
not be the most convenient forum, which may lead to litigation over § 1404(a)
transfer and forum non conveniens dismissal.
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